Thursday, January 07, 2010

Pareto Optimum

The following in this division were notes I wanted to keep but are not part of the posting. Just thoughts in no particular order being dumped out.

"Pareto efficiency does not necessarily result in a socially desirable distribution of resources, as it makes no statement about equality or the overall well-being of a society."

I would argue that would entirely depend on your definition of Optimum. From the start of the article it argued that the goal was "individuals better off". There is a lot of room there to define "better off". For example, I would not necessarily say that a person in a 100 room mansion is "better off" than a person in only a 50 room mansion. I would say ...

Was listening to the radio and reading some stuff they were making reference to and got me to thinking about random stuff. this is mostly stream of consciousness and has not been edited yet and being posted for whatever type of review it gets and will be changed in the future. Initially got off to a bad start imo. Rather than deleting those parts to omit them they are just not displayed using CSS. See source if for some bizarre reason you want to look at it. Anyway...

On a scale for issues to be from black and white to complex, and for a society to scale from homogeneous to diverse, what is the probability field for Strong Pareto Optimality to be met an ideal centrally planned republic following ideal policy of the Median Voter (as according to Median Voter Theory)?

If issue complexity and societal diversity can not be measured objectively then a range for central planning to determine the ideal application of Median Voter policy must be defined. Assuming ideal individuals, just as we are assuming ideal government (each being rational and all knowing), people should be left as freely as possible to make decisions for themselves being the most appropriate candidate to meet their needs.

Considering the set of needs of each individual as a point in the same field of issue complexity and person diversity with the point at which each individual is with regard to how well those needs are being met, necessary changes should be made in parallel. Considering the set of point pairs as necessary changes to maintain a Strong Pareto Optimum, it is efficient to apply similar transitions to any similar subset as to reduce the work in total necessary change. However, Republics given leaders that are members of the society in which they apply these transitions for, leaving the job to be done in parallel by the individuals is the shortest path to needs being met.

In the end this leaves a narrow scope for the most ideal national government to improve the lives of its citizenry through central economic planning. The scope for central economic planning should be limited inversely proportional to the diversity of the population as demonstrated. However, we can look further than the individual and a national policy. If a diverse citizenry chooses to seek like minded individuals, or diversity is a result of diverse regional environments then in the range of differences a tier of sets of sub regions of communities could be defined, and knowing that the individual is best left to make decisions concerning their needs as based on that level of diversity, so should the power be divided between those tiers.

This becomes more parent as one of the most important elements is introduced; people and governments are not all knowing or perfectly rational. In what ways do specific imperfections influence the necessity for a centrally planned economy or individual liberty in order to maintain a Strong Pareto Optimum?

No comments: